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National parks surely stand as the supreme 
acknowledgement of the importance of a country's natural 
heritage. The decision to establish a national park is 
never a product of complete consensus, of course. Even 
those who support creation of a park often disagree about 
policies administrators should adopt to maximize the park's 
value to society. 
Providing one source of disagreement is the decision 
about the extent to which a park's natural features should 
be sacrificed to development. In part, parks are 
established to preserve natural features, but those natural 
features must be altered to allow access and to enhance the 
experience of park visitors. The competing objectives of 
preservation and development are recognized in the legal 
acts which establish parks. New Zealand's National Parks 
Act is representative of many when it requires that parks be 
administered so that: 
They shall be preserved as far as possible in their 
natural state. • • (but) 
.•• the public shall have freedom of entry and 
access to the parks ••• (and) 
.	 • .development and operation of recreational 
and public amenities and related services 
appropriate for the public use and enjoyment 
of the park may be authorized. l 
INew Zealand, National Parks Act 1980, Part 1, sec. 
4(2)(a); sec. 4(2)(e); sec. 15(2). Enactment No. 66, 1980. 
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Further complicating the decision about the extent of 
development is the necessity to choose the method of 
providing development in the park. In particular, park 
authorities must decide whether to use public resources or 
allow private firms to provide particular products and 
services to park visitors. 
For some parks, the difficulty in determining the 
quantity and appropriate method of providing development is 
compounded because development itself is not valuable to all 
park visitors. For parks in many smaller countries like New 
Zealand, developed facilities are attractive mainly to 
visitors from other countries. For these parks, development 
enhances the value of the park to foreign visitors but 
reduces the value of the park to domestic visitors who 
prefer unaltered natural features. 
This paper restricts itself to types of park 
development which attract foreign tourists but alter natural 
features of value to domestic visitors. In addition, this 
paper limits itself to cases where park authorities choose 
to allow private firms to provide park development. If they 
permit private development, park managers typically grant 
firms concessions to provide particular services in the 
park. The purpose of this paper is to use economic theory 
to predict the effect on park development of the type of 
private concession granted, particularly whether a firm is 
granted an exclusive concession or whether competing firms 
are allowed to offer the product or service. That is, the 
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paper compares park development resulting from monopoly 
concessions to development resulting from competing 
concessions and evaluates use of the two policies in parks 
where development is valuable mainly to foreign visitors. 
The next section of this paper defines development as 
alterations to the park which attract foreign visitors. The 
adverse affect of development and congestion on domestic 
visitors is considered in the third section. Sections four 
and five develop the main model and its implications, 
concluding that monopoly concessions maximize profit from 
sale of developed services to foreigners and that monopoly 
development means less development is produced than under a 
competitive allocation of concessions. Reduced development 
and fewer foreign visitors resulting from monopoly 
concessions imply increased value to domestic visitors. 
Subsequent sections address potential complications. 
The effect of price discrimination on profit and output is 
considered. The dubious value of price controls on both 
competing and monopoly concessions is presented. Advantages 
and disadvantages of integrating several products under one 
concession are discussed. 
This paper addresses a limited number of the possible 
management strategies for national park concessions. The 
paper does not consider taxation, quantity restrictions, 
zoning, or government ownership of concessions. Despite its 
limits, this model is of interest to countries where 
development of natural areas attracts foreign visitors and 
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foreign currency at the expense of domestic citizens who 
either cannot afford to use developed areas or prefer 
undeveloped areas. 
2. Development 
Although development within a park can take many 
forms, development considered here has specific 
characteristics. Park development is defined in this paper 
as changes in the natural area that appeal to foreign 
visitors. Development is any alteration in a park's 
original condition, whether foot trails or luxury resorts, 
attractive to foreign tourists. To yield interesting 
results, development in a park must also have negative value 
to domestic visitors. That some alterations in a park are 
desired by domestic visitors is indisputable. Of concern 
here, however, are alterations in excess of those desired by 
domestic visitors. Development is whatever foreigners like 
and natives dislike. 
Development has two dimensions. The first is the pure 
quantity or capacity dimension. The number of restaurant 
tables is a measure of quantity of development. An increase 
in the quantity of development means an increase in the 
ability of the park to accommodate foreign visitors. 
Naturally, additional capacity is costly to produce. 
The second dimension of development is its quality or 
intensity. An increase in this dimension of development 
does not increase the number of foreign visitors that can be 
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accommodated, but does make the park more attractive to 
those visitors. Improvements in hotel rooms in a park is an 
example of an increase in quality of development. The 
number of rooms, and thus capacity of the park, has not 
changed, but the value of those rooms to a foreign visitor 
has increased. An increase in quality of development 
increases the amount foreigners are willing to pay to visit 
the park. 
Both dimensions of development are costly to produce. 
Both consume resources which have alternative use in the 
domestic economy. Any decision about development by private 
firms or by park managers must count this cost against the 
benefit of development. Direct cost, however, is only one 
of the sacrifices required to provide park development. 
3. Domestic Visitors, Development, and Congestion 
Foreign visitors are not the only individuals affected 
by park development. Policy suggested by this model must 
incorporate assumptions about the impact of park development 
on domestic visitors as well. Domestic visitors are assumed 
not only to eschew developed facilities, but to actively 
dislike them. Increases in development reduce the park's 
value to domestic visitors. The park is valuable to 
domestic visitors for its natural features, not its 
development. 
An individual living in the country visits the park if 
the value (reservation price) of the visit exceeds its cost, 
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primarily travel cost. Market demand is the appropriate 
summation of individual reservation prices. Without other 
restrictions, the number of domestic visitors increases 
until value to the last visitor is equal to travel cost. 
Increases in development shift back the market demand curve 
for the park, reducing the number of domestic visitors. 
It would be incorrect to assume a park's value to 
domestic visitors is altered only by the extent of 
development. Such a restriction neglects an important 
additional characteristic of recreation within parks: 
congestion. Largely because entry is not restricted,2 
people tend to continue arriving at parks past the point 
where congestion becomes an important consideration. Thus, 
the demand function of each potential park visitor must 
include congestion as an independent variable. An increase 
in congestion--an increase in the number of other visitors-­
reduces each individual's demand for the park. 
A park visit's value to a domestic visitor falls as 
the number of other park visitors increases. 3 In the 
simple case, it does not matter if the other visitors are 
foreigners since anyone's presence causes undesired 
congestion. By implication, an additional foreign visitor 
2Even with restricted entry or admission fees, 
congestion may be a factor. Because the number of visitors 
is smaller, the magnitude of the congestion effect is 
correspondingly less important, however. 
3That it reduces the value of a visit is one of 
several ways to view the effect of congestion on an 




means the last domestic visitor decides not to visit the 
park. 4 Since the last domestic visitor's value was just 
equal to cost, an additional person in the park reduces that 
visitor's value and means the visit is foregone. A more 
complicated assumption, which has no effect on the model's 
conclusions, allows an individual to have a different 
attitude toward congestion caused by foreign visitors than 
congestion caused by domestic visitors. In this case, one 
additional foreign visitor may reduce the number of domestic 
5visitors by more than or, more likely, less than one. 
In summary, park development affects domestic visitors 
both indirectly and directly. Because it attracts foreign 
visitors, development indirectly influences the park's value 
to domestic visitors. Additional foreign visitors mean 
additional congestion, fewer domestic visitors, and lower 
value to domestic visitors. The park's value to domestic 
visitors is directly affected by the quantity and intensity 
of development since development alters attractive natural 
features. 
4Foreign visitors are likely also adversely affected 
by congestion. However, the paper ignores the effect of 
congestion on foreign demand, thus avoiding the (unlikely) 
question of whether entry by domestic visitors should be 
restricted in order to increase revenue from foreign 
visitors. In New Zealand, for example, restricting entry by 
domestic visitors would be politically impossible. It is 
easy to imagine that foreign visitors are culturally 
conditioned to accept more congestion than domestic 
visitors. If so, ignoring congestion effects on foreigners 
may not do too much violence to reality. 
5Foreign tourists are concentrated in developed areas 
of the park and so have limited affect on domestic visitors. 
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4. Comparing Monopoly and Competition 
Faced with the necessity to control quantity and 
intensity of development, many park authorities choose to 
provide development using government resources. Public 
production of goods and services in parks is common. Of 
interest to this paper, however, are those cases where park 
managers grant permission for private firms to provide 
facilities within parks. 
Park managers place a variety of restrictions on 
concessions and use a variety of techniques to grant 
concessions within parks. At the most fundamental level, 
however, park managers decide whether to grant exclusive 
right to provide a product or service or to grant some non­
exclusive right. That is, the park manager chooses to 
create a monopoly or to encourage competition in providing 
development. 
Economics provides an extensive body of theory to 
predict behavior of monopolistic and competitive industries. 
This paper does not add to that theory but does apply it to 
the model of optimization of small-country park development. 
In particular, the theory of monopoly and competition is 
used to predict the degree of development in a park under 
monopoly and competing concessions. 
Although it is uncommon to do so, park managers could 
allow unrestricted provision of services within the park. 
With no entry restrictions, firms open facilities in the 
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park as long as they anticipate earning economic profit. 
Firms enter the park and produce additional development 
until average revenue from development equals average cost. 
Because of their aversion to unrestricted development, 
managers usually limit the number of competing concessions, 
if competing concession are permitted at all. It is these 
more common limited concessions that are defined as 
competing concessions here. 
If the number of concessions granted to provide a 
given service is greater than one but less than would occur 
with no restriction on entry, firms behave in a manner 
different than predicted by the economic model of perfect 
competition, and respond in one of several ways. One 
possibility is that firms tacitly or openly collude and act 
like a monopoly. Firms may also act in a manner consistent 
with some model of cooperative oligopoly. The first result, 
being identical to monopoly, is considered in the monopoly 
section of the paper. 
The second possibility implies some result between 
competition and monopoly so long as cooperation is imperfect 
and given the temptation to cheat on any cooperative 
agreement. If choices by firms in a cooperative oligopoly 
yield greater development and lower profit than monopoly, 
the policy advantages of monopoly remain and the discussion 




The third possibility, of interest to this section, is 
that firms compete. Even though entry is restricted, the 
nature of competition between firms is essentially similar 
to competition under unrestricted entry. Each firm tries to 
attract tourists by reducing price. Depending on 
assumptions about response by firms, price may fall to 
marginal cost. If firms are described by some non­
cooperative oligopoly, price above marginal cost is possible 
although competition in product quality erodes economic 
profit. This result is quite consistent whether the model 
is of competitive firms where entry is restricted or for 
models of non-cooperative oligopoly, Cournot-Nash equilibria 
being an example. 
Firms also compete by increasing product quality. 
Here quality is a characteristic which is readily observed 
and appeals to foreign visitors. In trying to attract 
foreign visitors, competing firms increase quality for the 
same reason they reduce price.' 
The pressure on competing firms to reduce price and 
increase quantity and quality (intensity) is a result of the 
fact that a competing firm's price and output decisions have 
'This view of quality is somewhat different from 
common practice where quality is a valuable characteristic 
not apparent to consumers before purchase. If quality is 
not readily measured, firms may misrepresent themselves and 
compete by reducing quality to reduce cost. If quality is 
measurable, predictions about competition and monopoly also 
depend on whether quantity and quality are substitutes, the 
degree of substitutability, and behavior of higher order 
derivatives of the consumer demand function. Only unusual 
changes in this paper's model would alter conclusions here. 
See the appendix. 
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an external effect on other f.irms. When it increases 
quantity of development, a competing firm ignores the effect 
of its decisions on other firms. The competing firm ignores 
the fact that increases in quantity ultimately reduce price 
received by other firms. The firm also ignores the fact 
that increases in its development quality (at a given price) 
reduce demand for development produced by other firms. 
By contrast, a monopoly recognizes the effect of its 
output and intensity decisions, since all consumers are 
customers of the monopoly. The monopoly only cares about 
increases in quantity that increase profit given the lower 
price. The monopoly only cares about increases in intensity 
of development as they increase total willingness to pay for 
development by foreigners. Because it recognizes that 
effects external to competing firms are internal to the 
monopoly, the monopoly produces less development quantity 
and less development intensity than produced by competing 
firms. 
5. Monopoly is Superior 
A park manager's objective is to allow that quantity 
and intensity of development which maximizes net social 
welfare. For the usual applications of welfare economics, 
net social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus, the area under the appropriate demand 
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curve' less opportunity cost of production. By this 
definition, monopoly is considered inferior to perfect 
competition since the monopoly produces an output at which 
some consumer and producer surplus is lost. 
However, the manager of the sort of park considered in 
this model does not maximize the usual social welfare 
function. The manager seeks to maximize the nation's net 
social welfare, a function of the happiness of the nation's 
citizens. As such, a manager is interested in foreign 
visitors only insofar as they spend valuable foreign 
currency within the country and to the extent that their 
presence makes domestic visitors worse off. Development, 
which attracts foreign visitors, is valuable only as it 
earns foreign currency and costly as it discourages domestic 
visitors and consumes the country's valuable resources. 
Making the usual assumptions about functional forms, 
maximization of social welfare requires choosing that level 
of park development which equates marginal gain in revenue 
from foreign tourists (less production cost) with marginal 
loss of consumer surplus from domestic visitors (less travel 
cost). 
Apparently contradicting traditional theory, this 
paper concludes monopoly concessions are superior to 
competing concessions. Not surprisingly, the contradiction 
'Choice of the appropriate demand curve to measure 
consumer value or consumer surplus is a subject of 
considerable debate but is of no interest here. The 
discussion here only uses directions of change in areas 
under demand curves, not exact magnitudes. 
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is only apparent. Given its assumptions, this paper's 
conclusion is easy to understand and is consistent with 
traditional theory. Simply stated, monopoly concessions are 
superior to competing concessions because monopoly 
concessions result in more profit from foreign tourists and 
greater value to domestic visitors. 
Foreign visitors to a park are only valuable as they 
spend foreign currency in excess of cost. A monopoly 
selling developed facilities to foreigners maximizes foreign 
currency revenue less operating cost. Competing concessions 
earn less economic profit than a monopoly, perhaps zero 
economic profit. Since foreigners are only valuable for 
their currency, the usual normative judgments against 
monopoly do not apply. The deadweight loss of consumer 
surplus due to monopoly pricing is not important since 
foreign consumer surplus is not important. The usually 
unimportant (or undesirable) transfer of consumer surplus to 
monopoly not only is important, but is a desirable transfer 
from foreigners to a domestic firm. 
The profit in foreign currency earned by a monopoly is 
the first of two reasons monopoly concessions are superior 
to competing concessions. A monopoly concession is also 
preferred by domestic visitors. Since they gain value from 
a park's natural features, any reduction in development 
makes domestic visitors better off. As previously shown, a 
monopoly concession produces a lower quantity and quality of 
development than competing concessions. Domestic visitors 
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prefer monopoly to competition since less development occurs 
under monopoly. 
Because it produces less development, a monopoly 
concession also serves fewer foreign tourists and, since the 
number of foreign tourists is smaller, the number of 
domestic visitors increases. Domestic visitors are 
sensitive to congestion produced by additional visitors of 
any kind. If foreigners do not visit, domestic tourists 
take their place. 
The conclusion that monopoly is a superior producer of 
park development is a result of the interesting assumptions 
of the model. Naturally, the conclusions here may be 
affected if these assumptions are altered. Subsequent 
sections of this paper consider the affect of adding some 
complexity to the assumptions. 
6. Price Discrimination 
The simple theory of monopoly assumes only one price 
is charged. The theory's conclusions change when the 
monopoly is permitted to price discriminate, price 
discrimination being defined as charging different prices to 
different consumers, prices based on willingness -to pay. 
A monopoly which price discriminates earns more profit 
than the simple monopoly, profit from two sources. For one, 
consumers who purchase the product from the simple monopoly 
now pay a higher price, at the extreme, a price equal to 
maximum willingness to pay. Second, the price 
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discriminating monopoly sells its product to consumers who 
did not purchase from the simple monopoly. A price 
discriminating monopoly sells its product as long as the 
price it can charge a consumer or group of consumers is 
higher than cost of production. If completely successful, 
the last unit is sold to the consumer who is just willing to 
pay the cost, the same consumer who would purchase the last 
unit of output under perfect competition. This perfectly 
price discriminating monopoly produces the same output as 
under perfect competition, and earns as additional profit 
the entire consumer surplus present under perfect 
competition. 
To a park manager, the additional profit earned by a 
discriminating monopoly makes it more attractive than the 
usual monopoly. Additional profit is earned from foreign 
tourists whose currency is valuable. To the extent that a 
price discriminating monopoly increases output, the 
superiority of monopoly over competition in supplying 
development is not assured, however. Since a price 
discriminating monopoly increases development, domestic 
visitors are worse off. 
Either of the monopoly situations is superior to 
competition since each either implies more profit from 
foreigners and, at worst, no more development than under 
competition. However, without measuring demand curves and 
assigning relative weights to foreign currency and domestic 
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consumer value, it is not possible to determine which of the 
monopoly situations is superior. 8 
7. Price Controls 
One popular policy chosen by park authorities who 
grant private concessions is to regulate prices charged. 
Two types of price control are considered here: price 
ceiling on standard monopoly and price floor on price 
discriminating monopoly. 
The most common price control imposed when a 
concession is granted is a ceiling on the price charged by a 
monopoly not engaged in price discrimination. This most 
common price control is also the most clearly incorrect 
choice. In the usual case, a price ceiling is used to force 
a monopoly to increase output and to reduce profit earned by 
the monopoly. Obviously, these two effects are exactly the 
opposite of the desired result for the manager of the sort 
of park considered in this model. The price control reduces 
the valuable currency earned from foreign tourists and 
increases quantity of development, thus making domestic 
visitors worse off. 
The only potential advantage of a price ceiling on a 
monopoly is that the monopoly may evade the price ceiling by 
reducing the quality of development. If the price ceiling 
is defined on quantity and not accurately defined over 
8The same difficulty is present in evaluating an 
entirely different policy: forbidding any development. 
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quality, the ceiling can be evaded by reducing the quality 
of development. It is hard to imagine such an effect 
justifies the other disadvantages of the ceiling, however. 
The second type of price control, of which no obvious 
example exists, is a price floor on a discriminating 
monopoly. Assume the monopoly can perfectly price 
discriminate. If a price floor is imposed above what 
otherwise would be the competitive output, the monopoly 
reduces output, since the monopoly would otherwise produce 
the competitive output. In fact, the price floor could be 
used to control the output of the monopoly since the 
monopoly always produces up to the point where the marginal 
value of additional development to foreigners is equal to 
the price floor. 
Setting price so that quantity chosen by the price 
discriminating monopoly is the same as that chosen by the 
standard monopoly yields a result superior to the standard 
monopoly. Quantity of development is the same as under the 
standard monopoly, but profits earned from foreigners are 
higher. The price discriminating monopoly captures all 
consumer surplus lost by the standard monopoly but produces 
no more output. In fact, since any output can be chosen by 
the park authority simply by choosing an appropriate price 
floor, a socially perfect output choice is possible. 
A complication appears if the monopoly cheats on the 
price floor by altering the intensity of development. Using 
the opposite argument as presented for a monopoly price 
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ceiling, the monopoly may increase the intensity of 
development in response the the price floor. Such an 
alteration makes domestic visitors worse off and reduces the 
effectiveness of a price floor in controlling development. 
In summary, the usual price ceiling on monopoly 
concessions is a poor policy in the case of small-country 
parks since it reduces profit earned from foreigners and 
increases quantity of development. A price floor on a 
discriminating monopoly may be useful in controlling 
quantity of development, depending on the degree to which 
alterations in quality are used to avoid the price control. 
8. Non-Competitive Services 
The park manager is faced with more than adopting a 
policy toward competing concessions. Some concessions 
provide services which do not compete but are related to one 
another, a park restaurant and housing accommodations being 
an example. The park manager may choose to allow separate 
firms to provide such services or permit a kind of 
conglomerate merger by allowing one firm to offer several of 
these services. Two related effects of this integration are 
relevant in the case of park development aimed at foreign 
tourists.' First, such integration overcomes some of the 
the public goods aspects of advertising. Second, 
'The various managerial and pecuniary economies of 
conglomerate merger are not considered here in favor of 




integration can assure consumers uniform quality given 
limited information. 
Advertising provides potential foreign visitors 
valuable information about characteristics of the advertised 
product. Part of what makes park facilities appealing is 
the attractive features of the park itself. If one firm 
advertises the attractions of a park in conjunction with 
facility advertising, other firms in the park benefit. 
Visitors attracted to the park because of the advertising 
use some unadvertised facilities. Because of this public 
goods characteristic of advertising, firms as a group tend 
to provide too little advertising. Each firm ignores the 
benefit to other firms of its advertising and exploits the 
advertising of other firms. A single integrated firm 
overcomes the public goods problem since advertising only 
benefits that firm. The integrated firm produces that 
quantity of advertising which maximizes the value of all 
advertising less cost. 
Similar reasoning suggests an integrated firm can 
assure uniform quality from the various components of a 
developed area. The cost to a foreign visitor of learning 
about the quality of each service in an area may be 
substantial. The knowledge that all services in a park are 
provided by one organization assures the visitor uniform 
quality from a variety of services. 
Of course, sufficient advertising may be provided 
without vertical integration. Local tourist associations, 
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local government agencies, or national tourist agencies 
provide group advertising funded through various 
contribution schemes or taxes. In this case, integration 
affords no advantage. Valuable quality information may be 
provided without integration also. Tour books, ratings, and 
associations can provide information about quality. Here 
firms producing development can jointly produce information 
or independent organizations can gain by selling 
information. 
11. Conclusion 
If parks have particular characteristics, park 
managers should grant firms exclusive right to provide 
products or services within the park. Thus, contrary to the 
usual case, the manager is wise to allow monopoly provision 
of park development. The particular characteristics include 
that park development is only attractive to foreign 
visitors, that foreign visitors are only valuable for the 
currency they spend, and that development and congestion 
reduce the park's value to domestic visitors. 
A park manager seeks to maximize the sum of foreign 
currency earnings less production cost of development and 
consumer surplus of domestic visitors less travel cost. 
Permitting monopoly to provide development means maximizing 
net revenue from sale of services to foreigners. Monopoly 
concessions also mean less development is produced than 
22 
under competing concessions. Less development and fewer 
foreign visitors mean increased value to domestic visitors. 
Economists live in a world of curious conclusions 
drawn from curious assumptions. This paper does not depart 
that world. With luck, however, the curious conclusions 
here address real-world problems of policy makers. 
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Appendix A: Mathematical Model of Monopoly and Competition 
One reasonable approach to mathematically describe 
behavior of competing and monopolistic producers of park 
development is a model used most recently by Keith Leffler 
(1982). Leffler's approach is particularly useful for 
deriving predictions about differences in product quality 
under monopoly and competition. 
This adaptation assumes park development has two 
characteristics desired by identical foreign tourists. 
Quantity of development (X) is the characteristic explicitly 
priced by producers. The second characteristic (Z) is some 
other desired aspect of development. Producers combine the 
two characteristics, implying quality of development (q): 
the proportion of Z per unit output (Z/X). Price per unit X 
is obviously positively related to q. 
An example of this combination of quantity and quality 
is a hotel room which has some level of quality, perhaps 
measured as floor space. For a given room, greater quality 
means more floor space (square metres per room). 
Those consumers using developed facilities, foreign 
tourists, derive value from the two characteristics. 10 
10Expenditures on other goods are assumed constant and 




(1 ) Total value = t(X,Z) t ,t < 0 xx zz 
Since quality (q) is the ratio of Z to X, marginal value or 
demand for an additional unit of development (X) includes 
the value of additional development and the value of the 
additional quality per ~nit of development (Z) and is 
written in a simple form. 
( 2 ) Marginal value = t +t q
x z 
Firms maximize revenue from sale of development less 
production cost. Production cost is assumed a function of 
the two characteristics. 
(3) Total Cost = c(X,qX) 
Leffler shows that competitive equilibrium maximizes 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
(4) Maximize t(X,qX) - c(X,qX) w.r.t. X,q 
Maximization implies first order conditions equating 
marginal value and cost of quantity and quality. 
A monopoly producer of park development maximizes 
profit given a downward-sloping demand (marginal value) for 
units of X for each level of quality and is assumed to use 
the same cost function as under competition. 
( 7 ) Maximize X(t +t q) - c(X,qX) w.r.t. X,qx z 
As in the usual monopoly models, first order 
conditions include consideration of the changes in marginal 
value as quantity increases. 
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(8 ) t +t q+X(t +2t +q2 t ) = c +qcx z xx zx zz x z 
(9 ) 
The respective first order conditions for competition 
and monopoly are identical on the right side of the 
equality. On the left side they differ by the following: 
(10) x(t +2t +q2 t )xx zx zz 
(11) x(t +2t +q2 t ).xx zx zz 
Line (lO) shows that, for any fixed level of quality, 
the monopoly produces less development than under 
competition. This is the usual result. Condition (11) 
shows that a monopoly producer of development ordinarily 
produces lower quality than under competition. Results 
would be ambiguous except that, in the case of park 
development, characteristics desired by foreigners and 
produced by firms are typically substitutes (txZ<O).ll 
Application of Leffler's mathematical model confirms 
that a monopoly producer of park development produces both a 
lower quantity and quality of development than under 
competition. The advantage that these results are explicit 
and easy to derive is partially offset by unrealistic 
assumptions about preferences of foreign visitors. 12 
11Leffler shows that for condition 11, sufficient 
convexity of t also leads to monopoly producing higherzz 
quality, Leffler (1982) p. 696, note 13. 
12If foreigners have different preferences for 
development characteristics, both monopoly and competitive 
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Appendix B: Mathematics of Domestic Visitor Value 
The previous section shows a simple mathematical model 
predicting the differences in development quality and 
quantity between monopoly and competition. The model 
predicts that a monopoly produces less development and 
attracts fewer foreign visitors than do competing firms. A 
park manager wishes to maximize value of the park less cost 
to the nation's citizens. A monopoly producer of 
development earns greater profit than competing producers 
and, as this section shows, monopoly concessions also yield 
greater value to domestic visitors than competing 
concessions. 
The model must show the effect on domestic visitor 
value of increases in the number of foreign visitors and of 
increases in development. Let the net value of the park to 
domestic visitor i be given by the following: 
Where V = the reservation price of domestic visitor i 
firms produce a variety of products with different 
proportions of the characteristics (Leffler, 1982, p. 957, 
note 5). Lancaster's (1979) model of monopolistic 
competition is a useful framework in this case. Lancaster's 
model cannot compare quality under competition and monopoly 
since more than one quality product is produced in each 
market structure. Monopoly does earn greater profit than 
competition. In addition, under conditions relevant to park 
development, monopoly produces lower total output than 
competition (Lancaster, 1982, p. 283). Under the same 
conditions, the monopoly also produces a smaller variety of 
products than does a competitive industry. The first two of 
these implications confirm results in this paper's model. 
The third is of no great interest here. 
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and reservation prices are arranged in 
order of decreasing reservation price, 
X = quantity of development, 13 
G = the number of foreign visitors (F) plus the 
number of domestic visitors (N), G=N+F, and 
C = travel cost, assumed identical for all domestic 
visitors. 14 
Domestic visitors continue to enter the park until the 
cost of travel is just equal to the reservation price for 
the last (Nth) visitor. 
Total value of the park to domestic visitors is the 
sum of reservation prices less travel cost to those who 
visit the park. 1s 
N 
(13)	 Total value = L[Vi(X,G)-C] 
i=l 
The equilibrium condition in equation (12) defines the 
number of visitors N as an implicit function of C, G, and X. 
Derivatives of the equilibrium condition incorporating the 
implicit function yield the comparative statics sought here. 
What is the effect on domestic visitors of an increase in 
13Quality of development is omitted to reduce 
mathematical complexity. Its inclusion in no way alters 
results. 
14Travel cost need not be assumed identical. If each 
traveller has different cost, the V function can be defined 
as rank-ordered reservation prices net of travel cost for 
domestic visitors. Travel cost is then included in the V 
function. Results are not affected. 
1SThe reservation price and cost to those who do not 
visit is ignored. They gain no value from the park. In 
fact, the value of the park to any citizen who does not 
visit is assumed zero. Inclusion of this latter (option 
value) makes conclusions from the model even stronger. 
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the number foreign visitors? Take the derivative of the 
equilibrium condition (12) with respect to F where G=F+N. 
(14) NfVg+V = 0g 
(15) N = -1f 
An additional foreign visitor means one domestic 
visitor chooses not to visit. The reduced number of 
domestic visitors coupled with the lower value to the 
remaining domestic visitors means an increase in the number 
of foreign visitors reduces the net value of the park to 
domestic visitors. Since competing concessions attract more 
foreign visitors than monopoly concessions, monopoly 
concessions are preferred by domestic visitors. 
Increases in development also make the net value of 
the park to domestic visitors fall. Take the derivative of 
equation (12) with respect to X. 
(16) v +V N = 0 x g x 
(17) N = -v IV < 0 x x g 
Additional development reduces the number of domestic 
visitors. Fewer domestic visitors and lower value to the 
remaining visitors means increases in development reduce net 
value of the park. Since competing concessions produce more 
development than monopoly concessions, monopoly concessions 
are preferred by domestic visitors. 
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